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Near Erbil, Iraq: the CBU was released at too low an altitude and these BLU-97 submunitions hit the ground
without arming. Their damaged state makes them unpredictable and very dangerous.

operational combat failure rates of U.S. munitions.”27 This is a remarkable admission
because it has broader implications than just
concerning cluster munitions. But consistent
with nongovernmental organisation and
field-based evidence, it also confirms actual
CBU failure rates might have little relationship with official “test” claims.28
In March 2006, Timothy McCormack, a
professor of international humanitarian law
at the University of Melbourne Law School,
led a review of the responses to a survey by
CCW States Parties regarding their views of
the relevance of IHL principles to explosive
remnants of war. McCormack concluded
that the CCW’s Protocol V should be sufficient to address the problem of ERW—but
if not, and the problem “only increases in
severity,” the call for a ban on cluster bombs
should not be unexpected. Significantly,
the report also argued that whatever the
outcome, “the onus is on user states to
demonstrate that such weapons can be used
consistently with the binding obligations of
IHL” (emphasis added).29
The announcement that the Belgian
government had adopted a comprehensive
ban on cluster munitions sent a ripple of
optimism through the Cluster Munition
Coalition, and thanks to good Belgian timing, it arrived just in advance of the CCW
meeting of States Parties in March 2006. In
one swoop, the Belgians have changed the
complexion of the cluster munitions campaign. While they have set the bar high,30
they have also reinforced the belief that an
international ban on something, not just
clean-up measures, is now possible. The final
ban text has been adopted by both houses of
parliament in Belgium as of this writing.
While the most comprehensive ban is
in Belgium (Austria is entering a parliamentary debate on a clusters moratorium),
several other states have made their reserva-
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tions known: “Australia, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, France, Germany, Greece,
Italy, the Netherlands, Norway,31 Poland,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the
United States have plans to withdraw from
service or have destroyed certain types of
cluster munitions.”32 Germany and Belgium
are considering a strategy of narrowing the
definition of cluster munitions so that a ban
excludes advanced models that are not expected to be problematic.33 The United States
is not Belgium, but even the U.S. military,
having distributed its own task-force report
in advance of the CCW, seems to be willing to consider major changes in its arsenal.
For the first time in a long time, a significant
international restriction on certain cluster
munitions appears to be within reach.
Continuing Debates
From the start, many ICBL campaigners had difficulty condoning technical
measures to address high cluster-munition
failure rates. They campaigned against
self-destruction, self-deactivation and selfneutralisation solutions for APMs and worry
that supporting technical fixes now may
compromise an absolutist principle defended
earlier. However, what if major players refuse
to join an all-out ban on cluster munitions,
even if they support a comprehensive ban on
anti-personnel mines?
Controversy also surrounds the debate
over what an “acceptable” failure rate might
look like. Less than 1-percent failure is a
typical cut-off point, but is also arbitrary. A
very small percentage of a very large number can still be a humanitarian disaster,
albeit a much-reduced danger compared
with that produced by a 10- to 30-percent
failure rate.
Yet, there may be a harm-reduction imperative to prioritising destruction of certain
more problematic “worst culprit” munitions,

whatever the future holds for a complete
ban. There is consensus within the CMC
for a moratorium on use, production and
trade of cluster munitions until their humanitarian problems have been resolved—
but not everyone has been in favour of
prioritising.34 Does highlighting the bulk of
the problem legitimate what remains? Some
worry that humanitarian law will be ignored
and they have suggested that cluster munitions might be used more indiscriminately
if their failure rates are “fixed.” Will militaries switch to other bombs, causing more
casualties, if cluster munitions are banned entirely?35
An interesting reverse-onus framework
outlined by Landmine Action (UK) and
consistent with one of the conclusions of
the McCormack report is that governments
should recognise all cluster munitions are
assumed prohibited unless users can “opt in”
with a guarantee that a particular munition
can be used safely.36 Might that approach fit
nicely with the destruction of legacy munitions with the highest failure rates?
A final point: If the failure rates of cluster
munitions were reduced to nil or next to nil,
would there remain a humanitarian problem
on a scale sufficient to sustain a campaign
for a comprehensive international ban?
See Endnotes,” page 110
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ines and explosive remnants of war continue to affect
many parts of the world. One such area is the Horn of
Africa, where wars have continued for the better part of
the 20th century. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1320 formally
established the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
in November 2000. At the same time, the U.N. Security Council
formally established a Mine Action Coordination Centre within
the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea. The resolution
requires the MACC to coordinate and provide technical assistance for
humanitarian mine action activities in the TSZ1 [temporary security
zone] and area adjacent to it.
History of the Mine and ERW Problem
The mine and ERW problems of Eritrea and Ethiopia stem from
three historical periods. Eritrea was colonised by the Italians in the
19th century. During the Second World War, Italian and British
forces fought a number of battles across Eritrea, culminating in a
major siege on the town of Keren in 1941, which lasted nearly three
months. These battles were fought in a conventional manner, consisting of aerial bombardments, artillery, small-arms fire and mine
emplacement. Certain areas around Keren are considered hazardous
today due to suspected contamination by mines and unexploded ordnance, particularly in the hills surrounding the township. Keren was
the scene of a major battle again during the independence war years
between 1961 and 1991.
After the Second World War, Eritrea was governed by Great
Britain until the early 1950s, when it was handed over to Ethiopia
to be part of the federation system; annexed by Ethiopia, Eritrea became its northernmost province. There was a resurgence of Eritrean
nationalism in the early 1960s when the Eritrean population began

an insurgent campaign for independence against Ethiopian forces.
This rebellion gradually developed into a more conventional war as
the Eritreans gained support for their cause, won key battles and held
ground. This struggle for independence lasted 30 years and affected
the entire country. The Eritrean struggle for independence is possibly
one of the most successful examples of a liberation war. Eritreans are
justifiably proud of the establishment of their country, as it was won
at great cost to the population and without “outside” help or support
from other nations.
After the state of Eritrea was established in 1993, following a
U.N.-monitored referendum in which the population voted overwhelmingly for independence, the relationship between Eritrea and
Ethiopia was cordial. This relationship continued until several issues
soured it, including the introduction of a new currency, the nakfa,
which replaced the Ethiopian birr. The situation eventually deteriorated into a war lasting from 1998 to 2000 over non-demarcated borders. Then in 2000, Algiers brokered a peace accord.
This border war was an intense conflict, with both sides employing conventional war strategies that developed into a carefully
planned and executed military operation reminiscent of World War I.
The war was fought at terrible cost with an estimated 70,000 people
killed and thousands more displaced. As a result of this conflict, the
entire border area between the two countries from the Sudan in the
west to the Djiboutian border in the east remains contaminated with
mines and ERW today.
Interrelationship between Mines and ERW
As a result of these conflicts, most of Eritrea and the northern
areas of Ethiopia remain contaminated with mines and conventional
ERW. In a recent incident, a truck driver collecting stones for a building site was killed when his vehicle drove over a landmine on a vacant
site just off a main road near the capital, Asmara. This mine was a
remnant of the independence war years, quite possibly overlooked
when the area was vacated.
In examining the history of the conflicts that have engulfed the
region, mines and ERW are interwoven menaces rather than separate
entities. It is not safe to just walk out to unexploded ordnance or
an abandoned tank and attempt to remove or destroy items without
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first establishing the history of the area and
what military actions occurred there. This
problem presents challenges to demining
and explosive-ordnance-disposal teams operating within the UNMEE area. Deminers
conducting clearance operations sometimes
encounter UXO and other ERW, including
abandoned military vehicles with live ammunition still on board. For example, during
battle-area clearance, a number of vehicles
with live ammunition scattered around them
were found. The vehicles had been set on fire
by retreating forces and the contents exploded, scattering the ammunition around the
burning vehicles. In such cases, a path has to
be cleared up to and around the vehicles to
enable teams to work safely.
Demining operations within a postconflict situation involving all aspects of
conventional war scenarios will generally
encounter a mixed threat of both mines
and ERW in areas where battles have taken
place and ground was contested. As battle
conditions develop, the area will become
littered with ERW of every imaginable description, in particular when the attacking
force seeks to dislodge the defenders. It is
inevitable that a percentage of the munitions directed at either side would fail to
function, either through accident or by design. Disabled or destroyed tanks and other
vehicles with supplies of ammunition present further challenges.
Problems Confronting the
Clearance Operation
A scenario of this type presents additional problems to the clearing agency. What is
perceived as the greater danger—the mined
ground or the littered ERW? In many cases,
local shepherds herding their animals have
encountered UXO lying on the ground and
resorted to throwing stones at it, through either idle curiosity or sheer boredom. Stones
landing on nearby mines have caused the
items to explode.
Locals scavenging among ERW for items
that can be recovered for sale, such as copper
and brass, enter mined areas in their quest
for such items out of economic necessity.2 In
many cases these people are killed or injured.
Emergency rescue measures, usually undertaken by demining organisations working in
the area, need to be conducted immediately
to recover the victim, or other locals will attempt an impromptu rescue operation, often
with equally tragic results. Being involved
in the recovery operation can be a traumatic
experience for many personnel.3
In some cases, clearance operations can
be disrupted when demining teams lack
suitably cross-trained, qualified personnel
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to remove or disarm UXO and ERW in conjunction with any mines encountered within
the clearance area.
ERW Encountered within UNMEE
Most conventional ERW items encountered within the UNMEE’s operations consist
of small-arms ammunition, mortars, artillery
shells to 155 mm and Boevaya Mashina/rocketpropelled grenade-type rockets. These items
have caused a number of casualties among
the local population living within the TSZ
and adjacent areas. Often the casualties are
children, who are curious by nature and play
with the items they encounter. These items,
although usually small, can inflict quite
horrific injuries to the child. A number of
submunitions and aerial bombs have also
been encountered during field operations.
Submunitions have streamers and are an attractive shape and colour that readily attract
a child’s curiosity.
Table 1 gives an overview of ERW items
encountered within the UNMEE.

Clearance Operations
Recommendations
As a result of identifying and mitigating the ERW problems in Eritrea, UNMEE
MACC has several recommendations for
developing a good clearance operation. A
thorough investigation is critical. A great deal
of the information can be gleaned from discussions with various parties, including local
inhabitants, militia, police and military personnel. Past operational reports from the area
will also be of assistance. If the region was the
subject of an Impact Survey and/or Technical
Survey, it is also extremely important to
consult the data presented in these reports.
The clearance operation should examine
the following:
• What is the history of the area?
• What forces and equipment were
involved? This will give an indication of the types of ERW likely to
be encountered. For example, tanks
and artillery will mean larger ERW;
submunitions can be delivered by

ERW Item

Recorded in Incident* and
Quantity Found Following
Incidents

F1 hand grenade

Yes—2

Chinese wooden HG (type unknown4)

Yes—1

M 75 Yugoslav HG frag

Yes—1

F1 HG fuse

Yes—3

Russian HG RGK3

Yes—1

RPG rocket

Yes—2

A fuse from an RPG rocket

Yes—1

Anti-aircraft bullet

Yes—1

POMZ

Yes—1

PMN

Yes—2

TM-46

Yes—5 

TM-57

Yes—1

Belgian plastic PRBM3

Yes—13

Czechoslovakian PT-MI-BA III

Yes—1

Unidentified HG

Yes—3

Unidentified UXO

Yes—4 

Unidentified AT mine

Yes—24

Unidentified explosive

Yes—1

TOTAL

67

Table 1: ERW Encountered in the UNMEE.
*Source: UNMEE MACC Preliminary Investigation Reports 2001–2005
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•

•

•

artillery. Aerial bombardments would
suggest the need to be conscious of
larger ordnance and the possibility
of submunitions.
What was the intensity and duration
of the campaign? A lengthy campaign
means the likelihood of a greater
number of ERW being present.
Did the contested land change hands?
It is the experience of UNMEE
MACC that contested areas that
changed hands resulted in many of
the mines laid by one side being recovered and re-laid in other areas by
the new owners.
What are the items of ERW encountered in operations to date? This will
determine the level of expertise required by the clearance organisation
to deal with likely finds as the clearance operation encounters the items.5
Depending on the number found
and their frequency, these specialised
personnel may need to remain on-site
or be within close proximity to the
operation while it is in progress. The
items of ERW will also determine the
type of equipment used to dispose of
these items.6
The area itself will need to be reviewed. If it is inhabited, the proximity of any discoveries of larger
ordnance, in particular, will present
additional considerations to the clearance operation. Should the item(s) be

destroyed in situ or removed? If the
item(s) cannot be moved due to lack
of specialised equipment, what measures need to be adopted to mitigate
the effects of destroying the item(s)? 7
• Abandoned military vehicles need
to be checked for ammunition and
other explosive devices. Approaches
to the vehicles need to be physically
cleared to eliminate the possibility
of mines. The presence of any potentially hazardous substances needs to
be considered also.
Conclusion
The experience of the UNMEE MACC
is that mines and conventional ERW are
an interwoven part of many clearance operations. However, it is essential to factor a
worst-case scenario into any plan. The types
of ERW encountered will determine the level of expertise required to complete the task
and deal with any finds in the course of it.
It is important that any clearance operation
have adequately trained personnel to deal
with ERW likely to be encountered during
the course of any task.
Staff members of the UNMEE MACC provided valuable assistance in the preparation of
this article.
For additional references and further
reading for this article, please visit http://
maic.jmu.edu/journal/10.1/feature/kudyba/
kudyba.htm/#addlrefs.
See Endnotes, page 111
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30,000 Square Meters Demined in Angola
Instituto Nacional de Desminagem (The National Institute for Demining) in Angola recently
announced it has demined more than 30,000 square meters (7.41 acres) of mine-affected land
in the country. INAD reported 12 anti-personnel mines, one anti-tank mine, 206 mortar
shells and various other explosive devices were destroyed as part of the clearance.
Fields demined by INAD were given to local populations for farming and other agricultural
pursuits. The organization has begun reconnaissance work to locate and identify more
mined areas in need of clearance.
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